2. The grounds on which Sigwart’s doctrine concerning the negative judgment rest have, therefore, each and all proved untenable. This must be so; for how could the truth of any doctrine be shown which would plunge everything into the greatest confusion?
Sigwart finds himself compelled to distinguish between the positive and the affirmative judgment, and the affirmative judgment--one hears and wonders at the new terminology--is according to him, closely examined, a negative judgment. On page 150 he says literally: “The primordial judgment can certainly not be termed the affirmative judgment, but is better described as the positive judgment, for only in opposition to the negative judgment, and _in so far as it rejects_ the possibility of a negation, is the simple statement A is B an affirmation,” and so on. Inasmuch as it “rejects.” What else can that mean than “so far as it denies”? As a matter of fact only those negations can, according to this new and extraordinary use of language, be called affirmations! Yet this would really mean, and particularly when it is said that the proposition A is B _is_ often such a negation (cf. the expressions just quoted), that the use of language would be reduced to a confusion quite unnecessary and altogether unendurable.
Not only is the affirmation--as set forth--according to Sigwart really a negation but also, paradoxical as it may seem, the negation, on close consideration, proves to be a positive judgment. It is true, Sigwart protests against those who, like Hobbes, would regard all negatives as affirmative judgments with negative predicates. But, following Sigwart, if this is not so, then these must be affirmative judgments with affirmative predicates, since he teaches that the subject is in every case a judgment, the predicate being the notion of invalidity. On p. 160 he says in the note the negation does away with a supposition, denies the validity, and this expression, considered in itself, might be taken to mean that Sigwart assumes here a special function of denial (absprechen) the contrary of that of affirmation (zusprechen). But no; a negative copula (cf. p. 153) according to him there is not.
Now what in the world is one to understand by “denial” (absprechen)? Does it mean the simple suppression (Aufhörenlassen) of the positive judgment upon the given subject matter, that is, according to Sigwart, the falling away of the feeling of compulsion previously given in a connexion between ideas? This is impossible, since the removal of this would bring about a condition in which the connexion of ideas remains, without being either affirmed or denied. How often does something of which we were previously certain become uncertain without our on this account denying it. What then is this denying? May we perhaps say that according to Sigwart it is a feeling oneself compelled (sich-genötigt-fühlen) to annul, whereas affirming is a feeling oneself compelled to posit? We should then have to say that all the while we are passing a negative judgment, we are in reality always seeking to pass a positive judgment, but that we experience a hindrance in so doing. The same consciousness, however, is felt by one who is clearly aware of the entire absence of a positive ground. For how can any one succeed in believing anything which he at the same time holds to be entirely ungrounded? Of no one, especially if Sigwart’s definition of the judgment be applied as the standard, is this conceivable; that is to say, every one in such a case will experience failure in such an attempt. Accordingly there is, as yet, no negative judgment. If then the rejection does not signify a negative copula it must manifestly be regarded as an instance of the affirmation of the predicate “false,” or (to use Sigwart’s term) as its “identification” with the judgment which in this case should be the subject. This “false” also cannot simply mean “untrue,” for I can assert “untrue” of thousands of things with regard to which the predicate “false,” which appears in certain judgments, would not be in place. If only judgments are true, then of everything which is not a judgment the predicate “untrue” must be affirmed, though certainly not on that account the predicate “false.” “False” must therefore be regarded as a positive predicate; and so from Sigwart’s point of view absolutely false in principle, certain as it is that the merely not being convinced (nicht-überzeugt-sein) is no denial, it is equally certain that we have actually no choice; we should be compelled to regard every negative judgment as a positive judgment with a positive predicate. So we arrive at a second and greater paradox.