This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington in an action brought by the appellant to recover fees for the years 1929-1933 paid under protest to the State Department of Public Works. The relevant statutory provisions are:

'Section 1. That hereafter every person, firm or corporation engaged in business as a public utility and subject to regulation as to rates and charges by the department of public works, except auto transportation companies and steamboat companies holding certificates under chapter 248 of the Laws of 1927, shall, on or before the first day of April of each year, file with the department of public works a statement on oath showing its gross operating revenue for the preceding calendar year or portion thereof and pay to the department of public works a fee of 1/10 of one per cent of such gross operating revenue: Provided, That the fee so paid shall in no case be less than ten dollars.'

Great Northern Railway Company v. Washington/Opinion of the Court

'Sec. 2. All sums collected by the director of public works under the provisions of this act shall within thirty days after their receipt be paid to the state treasurer, and by him deposited in a fund to be known as the public service revolving fund.'

Great Northern Railway Company v. Washington/Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court of the State has defined the exaction as a regulatory or inspection fee, and has declared that the fund created by the sums collected must be used solely for administering the State public service commission law.

Great Northern Railway Company v. Washington/Opinion of the Court

The complaint alleges that the Department of Public Works exercises jurisdiction and supervision over sundry public utilities, including common carriers by rail, electric, and street railways, gas, electrical and water companies, telegraph and telephone companies, wharfingers, warehousemen, and carriers by water, engages in many activities disconnected from, and unrelated to, the inspection and supervision of rail carriers, and has a variety of duties in the enforcement of the State's police power. The complaint affirms that the fee is not based upon or restricted to the cost of legitimate regulation or supervision but is used to defray the costs of other activities in connection with railroads and also of supervising and inspecting unrelated public utilities and of performing other duties the expense of which cannot legitimately be imposed upon carriers by rail; that the fee is grossly in excess of the reasonable cost of inspection and regulation of railroads; that, to January 1, 1933, there had accumulated from the fees collected more than $250,000 in excess of the amount expended by the department in the discharge of all its duties; that the statute is in truth a revenue measure; that the State taxes plaintiff's property and other like property on an ad valorem basis. The complaint charges that the fee is a burden on, and a regulation of, interstate commerce in violation of article 1, section 8 of the Constitution; is so arbitrary, excessive, discriminatory, and unequal as to deny the plaintiff equal protection of the laws and to deprive it of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The answer admits plaintiff's payment under protest; admits that the Department of Public Works exercises jurisdiction and supervision over many classes of public utilites, including common carriers, and that the plaintiff's property within the State is assessed on an ad valorem basis for taxes like other property; admits plaintiff's capacity to sue; but denies substantially all other allegations of the complaint.