[18] Mr. Wilson was in favor of this plan, and Mr. Madison seems to have favored it.
[20] _Ante_, Vol. I. Book I. ch. I. pp. 15-17.
[21] Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, _ay,_ 7; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, _no_, 3; Maryland, divided.
[22] They contained 1,793,407 inhabitants; the other eight States had 1,845,595 when the federal census of 1790 was taken.
[23] See the census of 1790, _post_, p. 55.
[24] The population of the States was adopted in the committee of the whole, instead of their quotas of contribution, which, in one or another form, was the alternative proposition. The slaves were included, in a proportion accounted for in the text, as a part of the aggregate _population_; and it was not until a subsequent stage of the proceedings that this result was defended on the ground of their forming part of the aggregate _wealth_ of the State.
[25] _Ante_, Vol. I. Book II. ch. III. p. 213, note 2, where the origin of the proportion of three fifths is explained.
[27] Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, _ay_, 6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, _no_, 5. Elliot, V. 182.
[29] Mr. Madison, Mr. Wilson, Mr. C. Pinckney, Mr. Dickinson. On the other hand, Mr. Williamson, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Bedford, and Mr. Butler strenuously opposed this plan.
[30] Accordingly, a proposition to extend the negative on State legislation to all cases received the votes of three States only, viz. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXECUTIVE AND THE JUDICIARY.
The construction of a national executive, although not surrounded by so many inherent practical difficulties as the formation of the legislative department, was likely to give rise to a great many opposite theories. The questions, of how many persons the executive ought to consist, in what mode the appointment should be made, and what were to be its relations to the legislative power, were attended with great diversities of opinion.
The question whether the executive should consist of one, or of more than one person, was likely to be influenced by the nature of the powers to be conferred upon the office. Foreseeing that it must necessarily be an office of great power, some of the members of the Convention thought that a single executive would approach too nearly to the model of the British government. These persons considered that the great requisites for an executive department--vigor, despatch, and responsibility--could be found in three persons as well as in one. Those, on the other hand, who favored the plan of a single magistrate, maintained that the prerogatives of the British monarchy would not necessarily furnish the model for the executive powers; and that unity in the executive would be the best safeguard against tyranny.