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PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
§ 8. Metaphysic is the science of that which is actual, not of that which is merely thinkable. By actuality we distinguish a thing that is from one that is not, an event that happens from one that does not happen, a relation that exists from one that does not exist.
It is improper to apply the term ‘Being’ to this distinction; for this term, according to the customary usage of speech, designates only one kind of actuality,—namely, the motionless existence of things, in opposition, for example, to the happening of events.
Yet more hazardous are the designations of ‘Position’ and ‘Putting.’ For, since the very form of the word in this case indicates a transaction, these designations easily mislead us into the wrong course of wishing to understand or describe this transaction of ‘putting’ or ‘positing’; or rather (as we choose to express the thought) of raising the inquiry, how ‘actuality in general’ is made. But no one can tell precisely how it is brought about that, in general, something is, instead of there not being anything at all; or how it is made possible that something enters existence through coming to pass, instead of everything remaining as it was of old.
This problem is not merely hopeless, but also contradictory. For every attempt to show how actuality originates, assumes the antecedent actuality of some conditions or other, out of which, or according to which, it originates. We can therefore never deduce all actuality, but always merely one form of actuality from another. And the problem of metaphysic is actually this: To discover the laws of the connection which unites the particular (simultaneous or successive) elements of actuality.
§ 9. If we summarize the most universal factors of the ordinary view of the world, it will be found to include the following suppositions: There are ‘Things’ in indefinite number; every thing supports certain ‘properties,’ and can, in so far as it has a previous existence, enter into all manner of ‘relations’ with other things; and these relations are the reason on account of which ‘changes’ originate in the things.
How much that is not lucid these suppositions contain, will be shown only little by little. At present, it is enough to remark that the two simplest of the conceptions here employed, that of a ‘Thing’ and that of its ‘Being,’ however lucid they appear at first, on closer consideration grow always more and more obscure.
While we require that the ‘Thing’ shall be thinkable before its properties, we, for all that, never achieve the actual thought of it otherwise than by means of its properties. While we further require that it must first ‘be,’ in order afterward to experience somewhat or to enter into relations with other things, we, for all that, never in experience find a ‘Being’ whose apparent rest does not itself rest upon uninterrupted motions and actions; nor are we able even in our thoughts to discover a perspicuous conception of what we mean by such ‘Being’ as this.
These dilemmas afford us the first materials for our investigation; more precisely, we treat first of the true significance of ‘Being,’ and afterward of the nature of that to which this particular species called actuality can appertain.
CHAPTER I. OF THE SIGNIFICANCE (THE CONCEPTION) OF ‘BEING.’
§ 10. If the ordinary understanding is questioned as to what it means when it mentions something as ‘Being,’ in opposition to not being, it will without doubt appeal to immediate perception, and assert: That ‘is,’ which may, in some manner or other, be the subject of experience by the senses.
If, however, we choose to formulate this expression exactly as follows,—‘To be’ signifies ‘to be the subject of experience,’—then this definition of ‘Being’ would by no means completely express what we actually mean by the word. For we ascribe ‘Being’ to what has been previously perceived, even when it is no longer perceived; and we consider its being perceived as only something which may possibly appertain to the thing in consequence of its unobserved, separate existence, but which is not identical with this.
In what now this unobserved ‘Being’ consists, the ordinary understanding explains very easily. While the things, that is to say, disappear from our perception, they still continue to stand in all kinds of relations with one another; and it is these ‘relations,’ in which, while they are not being observed, the ‘Being’ of things consists, and by which it is distinguished from ‘not being.’
In more general terms: ‘To be’ means ‘to stand in relations,’ and being perceived is itself only one such relation beside other relations.