In Russia the press has not the same influence on public opinion as in France. At best its declarations are the barometer by which to gauge how much can be printed according to the Russian press-laws, but they do not obligate the Russian government or His Majesty the Emperor of Russia in any way. In contrast with the voices of the Russian press I have the immediate testimony of Emperor Alexander himself, when a few months ago I had again the honor of being received by him in audience after the lapse of several years. I was then able to convince myself afresh that the emperor of Russia harbors no hostile feelings against us and does not intend to attack us, or to wage any aggressive wars at all. What the Russian press says, I do not believe, what Emperor Alexander says, I believe; I have absolute confidence in it. When both are in the scales, the testimony of the Russian press, with its hatred of Germany, rises light as a feather, and the personal testimony of Emperor Alexander has the only effective weight, so far as I am concerned. I repeat, therefore, the press does not induce me to consider our relations with Russia to be worse today than they were a year ago.

I now come to the other point, the allocation of the troops. It used to take place on a big scale, but only since 1879, when the Turkish war was concluded, has it assumed the proportions which today seem threatening. It may easily appear as if this accumulation of Russian troops near the German and Austrian frontiers--where their support is more difficult and more expensive than farther inland--could only be dictated by the intention of surprising and attacking one of the neighbors unprepared, _sans dire gare!_ (I cannot for the moment think of the German expression.) Well, I do not believe this. In the first place, it would be contrary to the character of the sovereign and his own words, and secondly its object could not easily be understood. Russia cannot intend to conquer any Prussian provinces, nor, I believe, any Austrian provinces. Russia has, I believe, as many Polish subjects as it cares to have, and has no desire to increase their numbers. To annex anything but Polish districts from Austria would be even more difficult. No reason exists, no pretense which could induce a European monarch suddenly to assail his neighbors. I even go so far in my confidence as to be convinced that a Russian war would not ensue if we should become involved in a French war because of some explosive happenings in France, which no one can foresee and which surely are not intended by the present French government. A French war, on the other hand, would be an absolute certainty if we should be involved in a Russian war, for no French government would be so strong that it could prevent it, even if it was inclined to do so. But as regards Russia I still declare that I am not looking for an attack; and I take back nothing from what I said last year.

The German Classics of The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Vol. X. — Part 152