This was a petition to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office to pass a homestead entry to patent. A demurrer to the answer was sustained, the defendants elected to stand on the answer, and a judgment awarding the writ was entered. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment (Lane v. United States ex rel. Newton, 48 App. D. C. 547), and the defendants prosecute this writ of error under section 250, cl. 6, of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1227).

The important statute, the construction of which is drawn in question by the defendants, is a provision in section 7 of the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1099 (Comp. St. § 5113), which declares: 'That after the lapse of two years from the date of the issuance of the receiver's receipt upon the final entry of any tract of land under the homestead, timber culture, desert land, or preemption laws, or under this act, and when there shall be no pending contest or protest against the validity of such entry, the entryman shall be entitled to a patent conveying the land by him entered, and the same shall be issued to him.'

Payne v. United States/Opinion of the Court

The facts which stand admitted can be shortly stated. Allen L. Newton, the relator, made a preliminary homestead entry at the local land office of a quarter section of land. At that time the land was withdrawn for forest purposes, but with the qualification that prior homestead settlers who continued in good faith to maintain their claims should be permitted to carry them to entry and patent. Newton claimed to be a prior settler and within the qualification. In due course, after publication of the regular notice, he submitted commutation proofs under the homestead law and paid the purchase price and the legal fees. The local land officers found the proofs satisfactory, permitted him to make final entry and issued thereon the usual receiver's receipt. That was on November 21, 1904, and there was no protest, contest or other proceeding against the entry within two years, nor until November 27, 1908. On the latter date the Commissioner of the General Land Office ordered a hearing upon a charge that Newton had not complied with the law in point of residence and cultivation; and on March 23, 1912, the Secretary of the Interior held in that proceeding that the charge was sustained and ordered the entry canceled. On May 14, 1918, the Secretary rescinded that order and directed that the entry be passed to patent under the statute before quoted. The following month the Secretary recalled his last action and caused a suit to be brought in the District Court of the district wherein the land is situate to cancel the receiver's receipt and quiet the title in the United States. The bill in that suit charged that the entry was fraudulently procured in that the proofs submitted by Mewton in respect of his settlement, residence and cultivation were false; and that charge is repeated in the answer in the present case. Further proceedings in the suit in the District Court have been suspended, it is said, to await the ultimate decision on this petition.

Payne v. United States/Opinion of the Court

Both courts below held that, as the final entry was not questioned by any protest or contest in the Land Department within two years after the issue of the receiver's receipt, the statute the provision in section 7-terminated the authority of that department to entertain any proceeding for the cancellation of the entry, and cast upon the Secretary and the Commissioner a plain and unqualified duty to pass the entry to patent. Whether that ruling was right or otherwise is the matter we are to consider.

Payne v. United States/Opinion of the Court