It is just this point that the critics missed; their minds being controlled by the conventions of the day. They could not see that if the horse-power in a man is _x_, that the circumference of his activities is a circle with _x_ as its radius. They could not see that if the horse-power of a machine is 100_x_; its circumference will be vastly greater than that of man’s; neither could they see that whilst in man _x_ is constant, provided the man is supplied regularly with beef, bread and beer, in a machine _x_ may be increased almost indefinitely, and that if a circle with _n_ as its circumference will not embrace the problem, probably all that is necessary is to add more _x_’s to its radius. Indeed, the science of mechanics is simplicity itself when compared with that of psychology, and as in war mechanics grow so will psychology, in comparison, dwindle, until perhaps we may see in armies as complete a change from hand-weapons to machine-weapons as we have seen in our workshops from hand-tools to machine-tools, and the economy will be as proportionate.
Before the Great War I was a believer in conscription and in the Nation in Arms; I was an 1870 soldier. My sojourn in the Tank Corps has dissipated these ideas. Today I am a believer in war mechanics, that is, in a mechanical army which requires few men and powerful machines. Equally am I a disbeliever in what a venerable acquaintance, old in ideas rather than years, said to me on the afternoon of November 11th, 1918. These are his words, and I repeat them as he exclaimed them: “Thank God we can now get back to real soldiering!”
LANGHAM HOTEL, LONDON, W.1. _November 20, 1919._
CHAPTER PAGE I. THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK 1 II. THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP 18 III. MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TANKS 35 IV. THE MARK I TANK AND ITS TACTICS 49 V. THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME AND ANCRE 54 VI. THE GROWTH OF THE TANK CORPS ORGANISATION 60 VII. TANK “ESPRIT DE CORPS” 68 VIII. TANK TACTICS 73 IX. THE BATTLE OF ARRAS 81 X. TANK BATTLE RECORDS 90 XI. THE SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA 98 XII. STAFF WORK AND BATTLE PREPARATION 103 XIII. THE BATTLE OF MESSINES 108 XIV. A TACTICAL APPRECIATION 113 XV. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES 117 XVI. TANK MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 125 XVII. THE THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA 130 XVIII. ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 135 XIX. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 140 XX. AN INFANTRY APPRECIATION OF TANKS 154 XXI. THE TANK CORPS TRAINING CENTRE 159 XXII. THE TANK SUPPLY COMPANIES 166 XXIII. THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME 172 XXIV. TANK SIGNALLING ORGANISATION 178 XXV. THE FRENCH TANK CORPS 184 XXVI. PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT OFFENSIVE 199 XXVII. THE BATTLES OF HAMEL AND MOREUIL 204 XXVIII. GERMAN TANK OPERATIONS 212 XXIX. THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 217 XXX. THE FIGHT OF A WHIPPET TANK 230 XXXI. GERMAN APPRECIATION OF BRITISH TANKS 236 XXXII. AEROPLANE CO-OPERATION WITH TANKS 242 XXXIII. THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME AND THE SECOND BATTLE OF ARRAS 250 XXXIV. GERMAN ANTI-TANK TACTICS 260 XXXV. THE BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI--ST. QUENTIN 266 XXXVI. THE U.S.A. TANK CORPS 277 XXXVII. THE BATTLES OF THE SELLE AND MAUBEUGE 283 XXXVIII. THE 17TH TANK ARMOURED CAR BATTALION 289 XXXIX. A RETROSPECT OF WHAT TANKS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED 297 XL. A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO 308 INDEX 323