Subsequent to the announcement of the decision of the court in the above cases, the United States filed a petition for clarification or reconsideration.
We have no occasion to reconsider the opinion as respects the necessity for modification of the decree entered by the District Court. In the many cases which have come here for review of decrees in suits brought by the Government for violation of the Sherman Law, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note, it has never been suggested that this court must accept the decree fashioned by the trial court, if we affirm that court's findings as to violation of the statute, and cannot modify the terms of relief as drafted by the court below. The practice has been the contrary. This is not only in conformity to the unquestioned power of an appellate court in an equity cause, but because in suits under the Sherman Act, it is unthinkable that Congress has entrusted the enforcement of a statute of such far-reaching importance to the judgment of a single judge, without review of the relief granted or denied by him.
In order that there may be no misunderstanding we think it well to add to the opinion in the following particulars.
1. The opinion states [[[323 U.S. 386]], 411, 65 S.Ct. 373, 386]:
'The royalties paid to the receiver by Hartford's lessees may, unless the District Court finds that Hartford has, since the entry of the receivership decree, violated the anti-trust laws, or acted contrary to the terms of the final decree as modified by this opinion, be paid over to Hartford. In any event Hartford should receive out of these royalties compensation on a quantum meruit basis, for services rendered to lessees.' The Government points out that had it not been for the receivership, many of the licensees (most of whom were not parties to the proceeding) would have paid no further royalties to Hartford, and that they may be able to justify refusal of payment of any royalties from the date of the receivership, and ought not to be put into the position of recovering royalties paid to the receiver, from Hartford.
It has been open to each of these licensees at any time to repudiate its lease and license, to return the leased machinery, to refuse to pay further rentals or royalties, and to defend any suit arising out of such refusal to pay, either for infringement or otherwise. It may be that licensees have not taken this course because they relied on the decree as entered by the District Court. In such reliance they may have expected that the moneys paid the receiver would be repaid to them.
In view of the modifications required by the opinion of this court, such licensees must pay reasonable rental and service charges on a quantum meruit basis, (leaving out of consideration any amount otherwise payable for the privilege of practicing the patented inventions involved) in respect of the machines used in the interim. Unless Hartford, since the entry of the decree by the District Court, has been guilty of some added violation of the anti-trust laws, licensees must elect (a) to remain licensees on such reasonable rental and royalty basis for the future as the District Court may fix, or (b) repudiate the leases and litigate their rights as against Hartford to retain any portion of the rents and royalties paid. Depending upon such election of each of the lessees, the District Court may, on the application of each, make an appropriate order for the disposition of the fund in the light of the licensees' election and the principles stated in the opinion of this court.
2. The Government expresses apprehension lest the statement in the opinion that the decree of the District Court is vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings would result in the existence of no judgment in effect in the interval between the issue of this court's mandate and the formulation of a new decree by the District Court. We need only say that the decree from which the appeal was taken stands until further order or orders are entered by the District Court pursuant to mandate.
3. In various portions of the opinion direction is given for provisions in the decree relating to 'feeders, formers, stackers and lehrs and patents covering these or improvements of them, or methods or processes used in connection with them, * * *.' It is said that this phraseology may omit the Owens and Hartford suction machine patents, including O'Neill suction patents acquired by Owens. The language used was intended to cover such suction machines.
4. The opinion [[[323 U.S. 419]], 65 S.Ct. 390] states: