BUTKHAK. ─────────────────────────┬──────────┬────────── │ Officers.│ Men. ─────────────────────────┼──────────┼────────── 2-9th Foot │ 3│ 101 5th Punjab Infantry │ 1│ 83 17th Bengal Cavalry │ 1│ 133
SHERPUR ─────────────────────────┬──────────┬────────── │ Officers.│ Men. ─────────────────────────┼──────────┼────────── F-A, Royal Horse │ 6│ 162 Artillery │ │ G-3, Royal Artillery │ 6│ 178 No. 1 Mountain Battery │ 4│ 138 No. 2 Mountain Battery │ 5│ 201 Hazara Mountain Battery │ 4│ 151 9th Lancers │ 17│ 287 3rd Bengal Cavalry │ 8│ 372 Guides’ Cavalry │ 4│ 275 2-9th Foot │ 15│ 442 67th Foot │ 25│ 721 72nd Foot │ 19│ 691 92nd Foot │ 20│ 681 23rd Pioneers │ 8│ 759 28th Punjab Infantry │ 8│ 651 3rd Sikhs │ 10│ 634 5th Punjab Infantry │ 7│ 476 5th Ghoorkas │ 8│ 636 2nd Ghoorkas │ 7│ 532 4th Ghoorkas │ 7│ 692 24th Punjab Infantry │ 8│ 717 5th Sikhs │ 8│ 670 Guides’ Infantry │ 6│ 607 ─────────────────────────┴──────────┴──────────
The two companies of sappers and miners which belong to this division, but are now at Luttabund, are about 150 strong. Staff and departmental officers number 90. The draft for the 9th Foot is 320 men, and for the 72nd Highlanders about 200. The artillery musters twelve 9-pounders and fourteen 7-pounders. I give the details of our strength here, so that, in case of any further operations, the force at General Roberts’s disposal may be estimated at its proper value.
On Friday Sir F. Roberts met Mr. Lepel Griffin on the road to Luttabund, and the General and his new Political Officer rode on to Sherpur together in the afternoon. Sir F. Roberts ordered a guard of honour (one company of the 5th Punjab Infantry) to escort Mr. Lepel Griffin from Siah Sung to the cantonment. This unusual honour was paid to the Political Officer in order that the local sirdars might be duly impressed with a sense of his dignity. The said sirdars turned out in great force, with their usual tag-rag of followers, and formed a picturesque _queue_ in rear of the General.
Mr. Lepel Griffin has made known to the Barakzai sirdars here what is to be the future of Afghanistan; and although many details of the scheme sanctioned by the Government of India cannot, of course, yet be settled, the outline is distinct enough. As to the difficulties to be overcome before the new arrangements mature, they are incidental to our position as conquerors of Cabul, and will be dealt with either diplomatically, or by force of arms, according to the temper of the tribal chiefs and others. As Mr. Griffin’s short speech to Wali Mahomed Khan, Hashim Khan, and the other Barakzai sirdars was of an informal kind—though necessarily carrying weight as an exposition of Government policy—I am only able to give its general purport, about which there can he no manner of doubt. It was to the effect that certain wrong impressions had got abroad concerning Yakub Khan and his possible return to Cabul. Such return the Government had decided could under no conditions take place; tribal chiefs and their followers had believed that if a sufficient turmoil were kept up, and turbulent demands made persistently for Yakub Khan’s return, that end might be gained. This was a total mistake. The ex-Amir would never be allowed to resume the power he had forfeited, and all disturbances with that object would be unavailing. It had also been found that during three generations the Durani sovereigns of Cabul had been unable, or unwilling, to carry out treaty obligations with India, and it had now been decided that their power should be curtailed and certain subdivisions made of Afghanistan. While the British Government had no desire to annex the country, they were resolved that Candahar and Herat must henceforth no longer appertain to the sovereign of Afghanistan. They would be separate and distinct, and the future ruler of Cabul would have to look upon them as removed from his jurisdiction.[40] It had also been determined that the army of occupation should remain in Afghanistan until a new ruler had been appointed strong enough to accept and carry out the obligations to be imposed upon him, and such a ruler would have to be found. He must be strong enough to ensure the protection of such Afghans as were the friends of the British, in order that, when the army withdrew, there might not be a risk of such men suffering for their fidelity to us. Our friends must be the friends of any ruler placed in power, and he must be prepared to protect them.