THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act.
Maxwell and Watkins brought an ejectment against Moore and others, to recover the northeast quarter of section ten, in township seven north, range seven west, containing 160 acres of land, in the county of White, and State of Arkansas. The plaintiffs claimed under the heirs of one McVey, upon the ground that, under the two acts of Congress of 1812 and 1826, McVey could not alienate his land, or covenant to convey it away before the issuance of a patent. There were other points involved in the trial in the State courts, as will be seen by a reference to 18 Arkansas Rep., 475. But the above was the only point before this court.
It was submitted on printed arguments by Mr. Fowler for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Watkins for the defendants.
Mr. Fowler contended, on the part of the plaintiffs in error, that the several amendatory acts engrafted on the act of May 6, 1812, continue also in force the prohibitory clause, declaring all sales, contracts, &c., void, where they are made before the patent issues. And, if so, the contract of sale made by McVey to Pelham was null and void; and the land, entered and patented in McVey's name, enured to the benefit of his heirs and their assignees, after the patent was issued, and not to Pelham, or his assignees, under such void contract.
The Circuit Court twice expressly decided that the contract of sale from McVey to Pelham was valid, denying distinctly the rights of McVey's heirs and their assignees, under these acts of Congress; which the Supreme Court of the State broadly affirmed. See the bill of exceptions, the judgment of the Supreme Court, and its opinion, in 18 Ark. Rep., p. 475 to 480.
Hence, the plaintiffs have a right to a revision of the judgment, under the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789.
The whole legislation upon these bounty lands, especially the acts above referred to, shows conclusively the intention of Congress to guard and protect the rights of the soldier and his heirs, and to prevent speculation in the lands.
And in all such cases, the courts construe such acts favorably and liberally, for the protection of the recipients of the bounty of the Government, and against the speculators in such bounty.
See 2 Laws, Instr., and Opin., p. 177, Opinion of Attor-General Taney, No. 115.
4 Ark. Rep., 279, Nicks's Heirs v. Rector.
1 Pet. Rep., 667, Ross v. Doe, ex dem. Barland et al.
16 Ark. Rep., 462, Wynn v. Garland.
2 Porter (Ala.) Rep., 152, McElyea v. Hayter.
The established rule of construction, and which is insisted, on the part of the plaintiffs in error, is applicable to and protects them in this case, is:
That where there are several legislative acts, in pari materia, relating to the same subject matter, as these are, they must be taken and compared together, in their construction, as one act, because they are considered as having one object in view, and as acting upon one system. And they must be considered as all governed by one spirit and policy, and intended to be consistent and harmonious in all their parts and provisions.
See 1 Kent's Com., (5th ed.,) 463.
23 Miss. Rep., 74, White v. Johnson.
1 Burr. Rep., 447, Rex v. Loxdale et al.
1 Dougl. Rep., 30, Ailesbury v. Pattison.
Smith's Com. on Stat. and Const. Construction, secs. 636, 637, 638, 639, 642, 643.
And the foregoing rule applies, although some of the statutes may have expired, or are not referred to in the subsequent acts.
See 1 Kent's Com., (5th ed.,) 463.
1 Burr. Rep., 447, Rex v. Loxdale et al.
Smith's Com. on Stat. and Const. Construction, secs. 637, 638.
Even a subsequent and amendatory act of limitations, not providing for a case specified in the former act, it will by the court be intended and presumed that the Legislature designed the latter to be governed by the previous act.
See 23 Miss. Rep., 301, Robertson v. De Moss.
See, also, on this point, Smith's Com. on Stat. and Const. Construction, secs. 638, 643.
The intention of Congress, from a fair construction of the several acts on the subject, was manifestly to protect the soldier in his float, as much as in his original warrant, and in either case to make all contracts of sale before the issuing of the patent void. And an object or thing which, within the intention of the Legislature in making a statute, is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter.
15 Johns. Rep., 380, 381, People v. Utica Ins. Co.
Smith's Com. on Stat. and Const. Construction, sec. 510.
Mr. Watkins said: