"And if the charge of it be objected, it may be answered that, by taking off one man from each ship that shall have these lieutenants (which man's victuals and wages is 1s. 4d. per diem), the lieutenant receiving as common pay, which is 8d. per diem, makes him 2s.; and truly, 'tis a sad lieutenant that's not worth two common men in time of action."
The enemy with whom we were about to engage was strong enough to call for the exercise of the whole power of England. He was not, however, of such resources but that it was within our means to overcome him by sufficient exertions. In number of seamen and ships the United Provinces excelled us largely, but not in the number of men available for war, or of ships equal to the strain of battle. England was still mainly an agricultural and pastoral country. She could, if needful, take nearly all her seamen for her fleet, and suspend her trade for a time. The Dutch Republics could not do so without ruin. Three hundred and sixty thousand people depended on the herring fishery for their subsistence. Amsterdam, according to the old proverb, was built upon herrings. Unless this trade could be pursued, ruin stared the State of Holland in the face. The over-sea commerce and the carrying trade were no less vital. The Dutch were the carriers by sea, and the importers of tropical produce, for all Europe. If the fishery and the over-sea trade were even seriously interrupted, the loss to Holland was colossal; therefore even an inability to drive the English fleets off the sea, though it might stop short of complete defeat for themselves, would entail such loss on the States that they would be forced to make peace.
In view of the strenuous exertions of both Charles I. and the Long Parliament to strengthen the English Navy, the Dutch Government ought certainly to have taken proportionate measures to increase their own. But the Dutch naval strength had been rather neglected. This error can be accounted for by more causes than one. The Republics had hitherto had to contend with Spain alone at sea, and she had long ceased to be a formidable enemy. In the meantime they had been called upon to maintain a constant land warfare, first against Spain alone, and then in the later stages of the European conflict called the Thirty Years' War. They had to keep on foot an army of 57,000 men, which was raised by voluntary enlistment and largely recruited abroad. It was therefore very costly, and to it the navy had been sacrificed. The princes of the House of Orange, though great soldiers and great statesmen, had not been uninfluenced by professional feeling. They had consequently devoted their attention mainly to the army by which they had won their own glory. Between economy and the want of statesmanlike military direction, the naval force had been treated in a somewhat peddling fashion. Its ships were slighter and smaller than the fine vessels constructed by the Petts. As they were also made flat-bottomed, in order to navigate the shallows of the Dutch coast, they were less weatherly than the English, and therefore liable to be out-manoeuvred and out-sailed in the open sea.