I. _Of Quantity._ Unity Plurality Totality.
II. _Of Quality._ Reality Negation Limitation.
III. _Of Relation._ Inherence and Subsistence (_Substantia et Accidens_) Causality and Dependence (_Cause and Effect_) Community (_Reciprocity between the agent and patient._)
IV. _Of Modality._ Possibility--Impossibility Existence--Non-existence Necessity--Contingence.
If we compare the first division of these categories with the first division of judgements we naturally think that Kant conceived singular, particular, and universal judgements to unify their terms by means of the conceptions of 'one', of 'some', and of 'all' respectively; and we form corresponding, though less confident, expectations in the case of the other divisions.
[21] This expectation is confirmed by Kant's view that judgement introduces unity into a plurality by means of a conception. This view leads us to expect that different forms of judgement--if there be any--will be distinguished by the different conceptions through which they unify the plurality; for it will naturally be the different conceptions involved which are responsible for the different kinds of unity effected.
Kant, however, makes no attempt to show that each form of judgement distinguished by Formal Logic involves a special conception. In fact, his view is that the activities of thought studied by Formal Logic do not originate or use any special conceptions at all. For his actual deduction of the categories[23] is occupied in showing that although thought, when exercised under the conditions under which it is studied by Formal Logic, does not originate and use conceptions of its own, it is able under certain other conditions to originate and use such conceptions, i. e. categories.[24] Hence if we attend only to the professed procedure of the deduction, we are compelled to admit that the deduction not only excludes any use of the 'clue' to the categories, supposed to be furnished by Formal Logic, but even fails to deduce them at all. For it does not even nominally attempt to discover the categories in detail, but reverts to the prior task of showing merely that there are categories. Doubtless Kant thinks that the forms of judgement formulated by Formal Logic in some way _suggest_ the conceptions which become operative in thought under these other conditions. Nevertheless, it is impossible to see how these forms of judgement can suggest these conceptions, unless they actually presuppose them.