The June 5th 1993 attack on Pakistanis was a major confrontation that occurred concurrently in different parts of the Somali capital of Mogadishu, between Somali citizens & militias against the Pakistani peacekeeping contingent of UNOSOM II.

The incident was sparked by an inspection or shut-down attempt of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) controlled Radio Mogadishu by UNOSOM troops. The SNA, under the leadership of General Mohammed Farah Aidid, denied initiating the attack and demanded an unbiased commission to ascertain the culprits. A UN inquiry the following year concluded that, although the attack was probably not premeditated, the SNA was most likely responsible.

June 1993 attack on Pakistani military in Somalia

The event marked a seminal moment for the United Nations operation in Somalia. It was the deadliest loss of UN peacekeepers since the Congo in 1961 and would lead to UNOSOM II being primarily characterized by the hunt for General Aidid. Following the passing of UNSCR 837 on 6 June 1993, UNOSOM II and the SNA would engage in a devastating four month long conflict until the cessation of hostilities following the Battle of Mogadishu.

June 1993 attack on Pakistani military in Somalia

Background

Rising tensions between UNOSOM II and SNA

Major disagreements between the UN and the Somali National Alliance began soon after the establishment of UNOSOM II, centering on the perceived true nature of the operations political mandate. By May 1993, relations between the SNA and UNOSOM were rapidly deteriorating.

June 1993 attack on Pakistani military in Somalia

In early May 1993, Gen. Aidid and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) agreed to convene a peace conference for central Somalia. In light of recent conflict between the two, the initiative was seen a major step towards halting the Somali Civil War. Gen. Aidid, having initiated the talks with Col. Yusuf, considered himself the conference chair, setting the agenda. Beginning 9 May, elder delegations from their respective clans, Habr Gidr and Majerteen, met. While Aidid and Yusuf aimed for a central Somalia-focused conference, they clashed with UNOSOM, which aimed to include other regions and replace Aidid's chairmanship with ex-President Abdullah Osman, a staunch critic of Aidid. As the conference began, Aidid sought assistance from UNOSOM ambassador Lansana Kouyate, who proposed air transport for delegates and a 14-day accommodation. However, he was called back to New York and replaced by April Glaspie, following which UNOSOM retracted its offer. Aidid resorted to private aircraft to transport delegates. Following the aircraft incident, Aidid would publicly rebuke the United Nations on Radio Mogadishu for interference in Somali internal affairs.

Aidid invited Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Adm. Johnathan Howe to open the conference, which was refused. The differences between Aidid and the UN proved to be too great, and the conference proceeded without the United Nations participation. On the 2 June 1993 the conference between Gen. Aidid and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf successfully concluded. Admiral Howe would be invited to witness the peace agreement, but again declined. The Galkacyo peace accord successfully ended large scale conflict in the Galgadud and Mudug regions of Somalia. The contention between the Somali National Alliance and UNOSOM from this point forward would begin to manifest in anti-UNOSOM propaganda broadcast from SNA controlled Radio Mogadishu.

Radio Mogadishu

Radio Mogadishu was a popular broadcasting station controlled by the SNA. It had in recent weeks begun airing anti American and anti-UNOSOM propaganda condemning interference in Somali politics after UN envoy Admiral Johnathan Howe had rejected the May peace conference Aidid had set up. On the airwaves Aidid would publicly accuse UNOSOM II of engaging in colonialism and "imperialist designs". These broadcasts greatly incensed UNOSOM officials and consequently a significant debate occurred over how best to deal with the station. According to then UNOSOM advisor John Drysdale, the UN's 'obsession' with the station was largely driven by US diplomat April Galspie. She held the view that the station should be destroyed or transferred to UNOSOM control, and felt so passionately about the issue that she had threatened to resign if the station was not dealt with. While certain UN officials felt that Radio Mogadishu broadcasts had become a threat to UNOSOM's image, other officials and advisors noted that the broadcasts rhetoric were relatively mild and well within the bounds of reasonable speech. Drysdale argues that, "There was virtually nothing in these broadcasts during May to which UNOSOM could have taken exception to. The language was moderate; there was no incitement, no subversion."