These are the criticisms which I have thought it necessary to make. It will be seen that, if found to be justified, they do not in the slightest degree prejudice either the correctness or the value of the author’s main argument, but rather lend to it a still wider significance. And so I conclude by expressing once again the wish that this suggestive little work, which, on its first appearance did not meet with sufficient general recognition, may in its second edition--where individual points have been corrected, much extended, and particularly the critical objections of scholars like Benfey, Steinthal and others, refuted with a laconic brevity, yet rare dialectical power--find that interest which the importance of the inquiry and its excellent treatment deserve.
Franz Brentano, son of Christian Brentano, and nephew of Clemens Brentano and Bettina von Arnim, was born on January 16, 1838, at Marienberg, near Boppard on the Rhine. He early embraced the study of philosophy and theology, both at Berlin, under Trendelenburg, and also at Munich. In 1864 he was ordained priest, and two years later became _privat docent_ in the University of Würzburg. In 1873 he was appointed professor there, but in the same year resigned his office in consequence of his changed attitude towards the Church, and as an opponent of the Vatican Council. Somewhat later, in response to this change in his convictions, he separated himself definitely from the Church.
In 1874 Brentano received a call to the University of Vienna, and continued there teaching Philosophy until 1895, first as ordinary professor, and afterwards, having meantime renounced his professorship, as _privat docent_. The reasons which led him to retire from this post also, are set forth in his work, _My Last Wishes for Austria_ (Stuttgart, 1895). After withdrawing from his post as teacher he took up his residence at Florence.
Brentano regards Aristotle as his real teacher in philosophy, and his two earliest publications, _Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles_ (Freiburg, i. Br. 1862), and _Die Psychologie des Aristoteles insbesondere seine Lehre vom_ νοῦς ποιητικός (Mainz, 1867), are a testimony to his comprehensive study and thorough knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy. Especially is he in agreement with the Stagirite regarding the high position he would assign to the application of the empirical method as the only one which, in regard alike to scientific and philosophical problems, is able by cautious and gradual advance, to attain to knowledge. These first principles of method, especially in their relation to psychological research, he has set forth and practised in his first systematic work, _Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte_ (vol. i., Leipzig, 1874). It was also his regard for this method of inquiry which early imbued him with a special interest for the works of the most eminent English philosophers of modern times, not only John Locke and David Hume, but also Bentham, the two Mills, Jevons and others. A study of these writers led Brentano to enter at length in his Würzburg lectures into a critical and explanatory treatment of English psychology and logic, characterizing it as a source of instruction and inspiration at a time when other distinguished advocates of German philosophy looked askance at this attitude towards English thought, believing that by its contact with English writers the peculiar character of German thought might suffer. It will be observed that only the first volume of the _Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint_ has hitherto appeared, and it seems hardly likely that the work in its present form will be continued, for further reflection convinced Brentano that _descriptive_[A] psychology, or Psychognosy, as of most importance in the examination and presentation of psychological problems, must be separated from _genetic psychology_,[B] a study necessarily half physiological in character; and that the former problem as the naturally earlier and least difficult study should first be as far as possible completed.