Antiochus, on this topic, seems to press his antagonist more closely. For since the Academicians adopted that rule, (for you understand that I am translating by this word what they call { ~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~},) that nothing can be perceived, he urged that they ought not to waver in their rule as in other matters, especially as the whole of their philosophy consisted in it: for that the fixing of what is true and false, known and unknown, is the supreme law of all philosophy. And since they adopted this principle, and wished to teach what ought to be received by each individual, and what rejected, undoubtedly, said he, they ought to perceive this very thing from which the whole judgment of what is true and false arises. He urged, in short, that there were these two principal objects in philosophy, the knowledge of truth, and the attainment of the chief good; and that a man could not be wise who was ignorant of either the beginning of knowledge, or of the end of desire, so as not to know either where to start from, or whither to seek to arrive at. But that to feel in doubt on these points, and not to have such confidence respecting them as to be unable to be shaken, is utterly incompatible with wisdom.
In this manner, therefore, it was more fitting to demand of them that they should at least admit that this fact was perceived, namely, that nothing could be perceived. But enough, I imagine, has been said of the inconsistency of their whole opinion, if, indeed, you can say that a man who approves of nothing has any opinion at all.
X. The next point for discussion is one which is copious enough, but rather abstruse; for it touches in some points on natural philosophy, so that I am afraid that I may be giving the man who will reply to me too much liberty and licence. For what can I think that he will do about abstruse and obscure matters, who seeks to deprive us of all light? But one might argue with great refinement the question,--with how much artificial skill, as it were, nature has made, first of all, every animal; secondly, man most especially;--how great the power of the senses is; in what manner things seen first affect us; then, how the desires, moved by these things, followed; and, lastly, in what manner we direct our senses to the perception of things. For the mind itself, which is the source of the senses, and which itself is sense, has a natural power, which it directs towards those things by which it is moved. Therefore it seizes on other things which are seen in such a manner as to use them at once; others it stores up; and from these memory arises: but all other things it arranges by similitudes, from which notions of things are engendered; which the Greeks call, at one time { ~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, and at another { ~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{ ~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. And when to this there is added reason and the conclusion of the argument, and a multitude of countless circumstances, then the perception of all those things is manifest, and the same reason, being made perfect by these steps, arrives at wisdom.