This is a civil suit under the antitrust laws that was decided below on a motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure at the time of the hearing below permitted summary judgment to be entered 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Since that time, an amendment to Rule 56, which is included in proposed changes submitted to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072, would add the following requirement:
'When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.'
But no such requirement was present when the present case was decided; and appellant, though strenuously opposing summary judgment and demanding a trial, submitted no such affidavits. It did, however, in its brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, make allegations concerning factual matters which the District Court thought were properly raised and which we think were relevant to a decision on the merits.
Appellant manufactures trucks and sells them (and parts) to distributors, to dealers, and to various large users. Both the distributors and dealers sell trucks (and parts) to users. Moreover, some distributors resell trucks (and parts) to dealers, selected with appellant's consent. All of the dealers sell trucks (and parts) only to users. The principal practices charged as violations of §§ 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3, concern limitations or restrictions on the territories within which distributors or dealers may sell and limitations or restrictions on the persons or classes of persons to whom they may sell. Typical of the territorial clause is the following:
'Distributor is hereby granted the exclusive right, except as hereinafter provided, to sell during the life of this agreement, in the territory described below, White and Autocar trucks purchased from Company hereunder.
'STATE OF CALIFORNIA: Territory to consist of all of Sonoma County, south of a line starting at the western boundary, or Pacific Coast, passing through the City of Bodega, and extending due east to the east boundary line of Sonoma County, with the exception of the sale of fire truck chassis to the State of California and all political subdivisions thereof.
'Distributor agrees to develop the aforementioned territory to the satisfaction of Company, and not to sell any trucks purchased hereunder except in accordance with this agreement, and not to sell such trucks except to individuals, firms, or corporations having a place of business and/or purchasing headquarters in said territory.'
Typical of the customer clause is the following:
'Distributor further agrees not to sell nor to authorize his dealers to sell such trucks to any Federal or State government or any department or political subdivision thereof, unless the right to do so is specifically granted by Company in writing.'
These provisions, applicable to distributors and dealers alike, are claimed by appellee to be per se violations of the Sherman Act. The District Court adopted that view and granted summary judgment accordingly. 194 F.Supp. 562. We noted probable jurisdiction. 369 U.S. 858, 82 S.Ct. 946, 8 L.Ed.2d 17. See 15 U.S.C. § 29.