Mr. Justice CLARK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BLACK join, dissenting.
The Court is reluctant to declare vertical territorial arrangements illegal per se because 'This is the first case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement; and we know too little of the actual impact * * * of that restriction * * * to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the documentary evidence before us.' The 'bare bones' consist of the complaint and answer, excerpts from interrogatories, exhibits and deposition of the secretary of White Motor on behalf of the Government, taken in 1959, the formal motion of the Government for summary judgment and an excerpt entitled 'Argument' from the brief of White Motor in opposition thereto. I believe that these 'bare bones' really lay bare one of the most brazen violations of the Sherman Act that I have experienced in a quarter of a century.
This 'argument,' which the appellant has convinced the Court raises a factual issue requiring a trial, points out that each distributor is required to maintain a sales room, service station and a representative number of White trucks. 'In return for these agreements of the distributor * * * it is only fair and reasonable and, in fact, necessary * * * that the distributor shall be protected in said distributor's territory against selling therein by defendant's other distributors * * * who have not made the investment of money and effort * * * in the said territory.' Likewise, appellant's argument continues, 'similar provisions in direct dealers' contracts and in contracts between the distributors and their respective dealers have the same purposes and the same effects.' These limitations have 'the purpose and effect of promoting the business and increasing the sales of White trucks in competition with The White Motor Company's powerful competitors.' Emphasizing that the motor-truck manufacturing industry is one of 'the most highly competitive industries in this country,' appellant points up that its share 'is very small' and 'by no stretch of the imagination, could be said to dominate the market in trucks.' It insists that there are but two ways to market trucks: (1) selling to the public through its own sales and service stations, and (2) through the distributor-dealer distribution system which it presently follows. It discards the first as being 'feasible only for a very large company.' As to the second, the distributors and dealers must not be allowed to spread their efforts 'too thinly over more territory than they can vigorously and intensively work.' It is therefore necessary, appellant says, 'to confine their efforts to a territory no larger than they have the financial means and sales and service facilities and capabilities to intensively cultivate * * *.' In return 'it is only fair and reasonable, and indeed necessary, that The White Motor Company protect its dealers and distributors in their respective allotted territories against the exploitation by other White distributors or dealers, and indeed by the Company itself * * *.' In order to procure 'distributors and dealers that will adequately represent The White Motor Company's line of motor trucks, (it) has to agree that these men shall be exclusive sales representatives in a given territory.' For this reason appellant 'will not allow any other of its distributors or dealers to come into the territory and scalp the market for White trucks therein.' Rather than 'cutting each other's throats' White Motor insists that they 'concentrate on trying to take sales away from other competing truck manufacturers * * *.' The net effect of its justification for the territorial allocation is that 'these limitations have proper purposes and effects and are fair and reasonable * * *.' (Italicized in original.)
On the price-fixing requirement in the contracts, which White Motor has abandoned on appeal, the 'argument' points out that this requirement was limited to about 5% of its sales and was not followed in sales to the public. Justification for its use otherwise was that it insured that all of its agents 'get an equal break pricewise,' which was a necessary step to having 'satisfied and efficient dealer organizations.' As to the required discounts provision on repair parts and accessories, it says that these are necessary 'if the defendant's future sales to 'National Accounts,' 'Fleet Accounts' and Federal and State governments * * * and political subdivisions * * * are not to be seriously jeopardized.' After all, it says, 'probably nothing will make the owner of a motor vehicle so peeved as to be overcharged for repair parts and accessories.'