The proposed law made no provisions as to the relations of the Consuls to the Minister of Foreign affairs. That matter was to be settled by a Norwegian State Ordinance, dictated by the Ministry. It is easy to imagine its intended basis by the Special Committee emphatically declaring it to be their opinion that the Norwegian Cabinet had made too many concessions in the last Consular negotiations. To begin with, it was intimated in the Norwegian papers, that the matter referring to the Consular Service and Diplomatic Department would be settled by treaty with Sweden, a most illusive moderation, considering Norway, as previously mentioned[55:1], by fixing the date when the laws would first be in force, had alone the power of considering the basis of the possible agreement. But this intimation was very soon contradicted; Norway would take matters entirely into her own hands. And it was openly hinted, that if the King found that he ought to sanction the law, they would then proceed further with the question of their own Minister for Foreign affairs.

[Sidenote: _The revolutionary basis of the proposal._]

The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis — Part 47

The tactics in the whole of the procedings are characterised as being revolutionary against the Union, its object being by one sided Norwegian resolutions to dissolve the joint Foreign Administration. And as regards the Consular question it has been explained that to withdraw without consulting Sweden a part of the Foreign affairs from the Minister of Foreign affairs who was mainly responsible for them, was utterly unreasonable.

The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis — Part 47

To what then did the Storthing invite the King? Simply this, _to take a revolutionary step against the Union, to an initiatory dissolution of the Union, to a protracted undermining of the foundation of the Union_, far more dangerous than severing it at one blow. And the ugly thought in the background was this: If the King did not submit to this, it would be shouted out all over the world, that the King was faithless to the interests of Norway, and had denied Norway's Sovereign rights; then he should bear the blame for what would happen, the revolutionary rupture of the bonds of Union. But not alone on him would the blame be thrown. The King in the first place should be put to the proof. But, if the King said 'No', »it cannot», Mr NANSEN says, »be the result of Norwegian influence, _but on account of Swedish pressure_»[56:1]. Here we are met by the dishonourable train of thought that has formed the foundation on which the Norwegian Radicals have built the whole of their work for undermining the Union, that is, never to acknowledge the true motive--piety towards the Union--when the King opposed the one-sided disloyal demands of Norway, but instead always point to Swedish interests as the ruling motive. And nevertheless, it is certain, that no Swedish-Norwegian King has kept in view the Union, and _all it implied on all sides_, more faithfully than King OSCAR II.

The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis — Part 47