Braddish v DPP [2001] 3 IR 127 was an Irish Supreme Court decision that established principles in relation to gathering of evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that "the Gardaí are under a duty to seek out and preserve all evidence bearing on the guilt and innocence of an accused." Daniel Braddish, the applicant, sought a prohibitory injunction against his approaching prosecution for robbery. Video evidence of the alleged crime had been in the possession of the Gardaí but was no longer available. The effort to have the prosecution overturned was refused in the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the Applicant was entitled to the relief sought and accordingly made an order to quash the prosecution.
Background of the case
Facts of case
On 2 July 1997, a robbery occurred in a shop in Limerick which had been secured by surveillance camera. A Garda examined the tape and he concluded that it demonstrated the robbery in progress, clearly showing Braddish committing the crime. Subsequently, Braddish was arrested and detained under section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984. While in custody, Braddish confessed and signed a statement that he had indeed committed the robbery. He was then released from custody and nine months later charged with the robbery. Braddish was first tried before the Limerick Circuit Criminal Court on 24 March 1999 and a retrial was ordered as the jury could not reach an agreement. The retrial was held before Haugh J on 20 April 1999 where he did not allow evidence in stills taken from the video tape while it was with the Garda. Haugh J prohibited the submission of this evidence because the actual video tape was not presented. Hence, the jury was discharged to save Braddish from being in an unfair situation before the Court. On 14 June 1999, he sought for judicial review on the basis that a continuation of his trial would a breach of his constitutional right to fair trial because the prosecution did not produce original evidence to him.
High Court decision
The Gardaí had been in possession of a video that showed the alleged crime. However, that evidence was no longer available. The videotape was returned to the shop after Braddish had confessed. Hence, Braddish had sought a prohibitory injunction against his approaching prosecution. Nevertheless, High Court refused such relief because the prosecution was relying on his confession rather than on the videotape. Had prosecution tried to rely on photographic evidence, then there would have been a significant problem as Braddish would not have had the opportunity to contest the evidence put against him. The Judge also took note of when the request for the video tape was made by the Counsel on behalf of Braddish.
The issue before the Court was whether or not there is a need to prevent Braddish's further prosecution solely because the video tape was now unavailable. That piece of evidence was vital as it showed Braddish executing the crime and this was the only evidence available which identified him as the perpetrator. No other identification evidence was presented.
Holding of the Supreme Court
While in Garda custody, Braddish made an inculpatory statement by confessing that he was the culprit in the video tape which was also signed by him. The prosecution's case was based wholly on the alleged confession that was made by Braddish, rather than on the video tape evidence.
It was settled in this case that evidence admissible in relation to guilt or innocence must be preserved, heretofore necessary and practicable, until the judgment of the trial. This same rationale was accepted by Lynch J in the case of Robert Murphy v DPP which the Supreme Court cited and agreed to. Respondents asserted that at core this case was being advanced because of the alleged inculpatory statement made by Braddish. Even if the video tape was produced before the Court, Braddish would not benefit from it anyway and if anything, the only one at a disadvantage with the reintroduction of this tape is the prosecution. Hence, the absence of the video evidence should not be a sufficient ground for him to receive any relief from the Court.