The end of these operations was somewhat tame. Sir David Mitchell had been left with sixteen ships of the line of the middle and lower rates. On the 15th October Sir George Rooke arrived from England with a squadron, and the total force of the allies was raised to thirty sail, exclusive of the small craft. Information, no more accurate than the false report which drew Russell away from Palamos, led Rooke to believe that a powerful French fleet was coming to sea. He took refuge in Cadiz harbour, and there spent the winter. Sir David Mitchell was once sent out in search of some French vessels said to be lying in Lagos Bay, but they were not found, and the allies were otherwise quiescent. Meanwhile, King Louis was indeed preparing to make an attack, or rather a double attack, on King William. During the early days of 1696 Sir John Fenwick’s assassination plot was hatching in England, to the knowledge and with the approval of the French sovereign and the exiled King James. Troops were collected at Calais to be pushed over so soon as the murder of King William was known to have been achieved. In the meanwhile a fleet of fifty-one sail was being prepared at Toulon with considerable difficulty, partly through the penury of the French Government, partly because of the pertinacity of its sailors in resisting or evading service. The object of this armament was to provide a force which should be at hand to take advantage of the confusion expected to ensue on the violent death of King William. It is known to all that this complicated scheme of combined murder and military operations broke down. Fenwick’s plot was revealed to the Government. The great ships which had come home with Russell in the autumn were hurried to sea in February, and the French coast was patrolled and orders were sent to Rooke to return at once.
These orders reached him at a time when his mind was much exercised by reports of the approach of the French fleet from Toulon. He put to sea in the early days of March. The enemy had already sailed under the command of Châteaurenault. It is one more illustration of the rather modest standard of efficiency expected from the ship of the time, that to send a fleet to sea so early as March was counted hazardous. The result went to show that the estimate was not wholly unjust. Both fleets were scattered in a storm, and suffered damage. They returned to port, but again put to sea so soon as their injuries were made good. Rooke, who had the start, reached home on the 22nd April. Châteaurenault ran into Brest about a fortnight later—not unobserved, but unopposed. This escape of his fleet was added to the list of naval miscarriages of which Parliament was constantly complaining. Rooke and Mitchell were called to account, but no blame appears to have been thought to attach to them. Indeed, the error lay mainly in the Government. It ought to have kept a more powerful force in the Straits if it wished to prevent the French from leaving the Mediterranean. Fenwick’s plot was the last resolute effort made by the enemy against the Government established by the Revolution. Peace was becoming an absolute necessity for France, and it was made at Ryswick in 1697.