It is more pertinent to ask whether it would not have been better policy on the part of the Germans to have got inside the range of _Canopus_--for obviously if she had fired over the hills she would not be able to use her guns at short range--and then bring the British squadron under an accurate bombardment just when they were coming out of harbour and unable to use their armament to effect. The same considerations that weighed with Admiral Sturdee in deciding to allow _Canopus_ to open fire with the possible result of driving them off, should have weighed with the German captain and made him realize that once the battle-cruisers were out of harbour, there was no possible escape either for his ship or for the flagship. And it is undoubtedly certain that whether they could have succeeded in sinking and destroying any British ships before being destroyed themselves, they must have done vastly greater damage than they were, in fact, able to inflict in an action which, as we shall see, the British Admiral was able to fight on his own conditions from first to last. The main features of the final issue--that is, the destruction of the two armoured cruisers--could certainly not have been prevented, but had they closed the range, and fought the British ships as they came out, the complete escape of the light cruisers could have been assured, and it is certain that they could have done very great damage before being destroyed themselves.
4. “At 9:45 A.M. the squadron--less the _Bristol_--weighed, and proceeded out of harbour in the following order: _Carnarvon_, _Inflexible_, _Invincible_, and _Cornwall_. On passing Cape Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the southeast, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the northwest.”
At 9:45, when the squadron got clear of the harbour and was working up to full speed, the Germans, whose main squadron was about 8½ sea miles off at 9:30, while _Gneisenau_ and _Nürnberg_ were three miles closer in, were probably about twelve or thirteen miles off. There was then a gap of five or six miles to be made up before action range could be reached, and to make this good in three hours the British squadron would have to produce a speed greater by some two knots.