THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Arkansas.
The case is fully stated in the opinion of the court.
It was submitted upon printed arguments by Mr. Pike for the appellants, and Mr. Meigs for the appellee.
The arguments upon both sides took a wide range, and included many points which would have been applicable, if a suit had been brought at law upon the covenant of warranty, such as that there could be no recovery, except for nominal damages, until the vendee was evicted. With respect to the interposition of a court of equity in a case situated like the present, Mr. Pike said:
The chief question in this case is a perfectly simple one. Woodfolk proposed to purchase certain land of Notrebe; he was informed that it was mortgaged to the Real Estate Bank, which was insolvent. The mortgage was of record; and the charter of the bank, showing the liability under the mortgage, was a public law of the land. It was totally uncertain what would be the ultimate liability under the mortgage. It was meant to cover the share of Notrebe and Cummins in any deficit of the assets of the bank. Whether there would be any deficit or not was not known. Notrebe told Woodfolk all he knew about it; that the bank attorney thought there would not. All the sources and means of information on that subject were as open to Woodfolk as Notrebe; and knowing, or having the means of knowing, all that anybody could know, he purchased the land at the low price of $10.50 per acre, and took a bond from Notrebe, to make him 'a good and sufficient conveyance in fee simple, with covenant of warranty.'
Can he, after occupying the land several years, and paying up the purchase money, when it is still as uncertain as ever, what, if any, will be the ultimate liability under the stock mortgage, claim at the hands of a court of equity that it shall compel Notrebe's heirs to indemnify him against such contingent liability? Or will it not be held that he made a chancing bargain, an aleatory contract, getting the land at the price he did on account of the contingent encumbrance upon it, and taking the risk of that encumbrance? That is the whole question.
(Mr. Pike then proceeded to argue that the words of the covenant did not bind Notrebe to make a conveyance with a covenant against encumbrances.)
The quia timet jurisdiction of the court of equity is one which the court has often exercised; but it will be extremely tender in so doing, because it materially varies the agreement of the parties at the time of the transaction.
Flight v. Cook, 2 Ves. Sen., 620.
And the doctrine seems to be well settled, that where a deed has been executed, and the only covenants in it are for quiet enjoyment or of warranty, and so long as there has been no eviction, actual or constructive, equity will, as a general rule, refuse to entertain a bill for relief, either by way of enjoining the purchase money, or a fortiori, by rescinding the contract; and, although it has been at times intimated that the presence of a covenant for seizin may in some cases fortify the position of the purchaser, it does not appear that the cases generally draw much distinction between the different covenants for title.
Rawle on Cov. for Title, 679, and the many cases cited.
If this contract is still executory, then in that case, as a general rule, the purchaser is entitled to a good title, free of encumbrances. He cannot be forced specifically to perform, unless such title can be made. If sued for the purchase money, he may enjoin its collection, or compel the removal of encumbrances. That is the general rule. But the question here is, what relief has he in equity, if, making the bargain, knowing of an encumbrance, he pays up the purchase money without requiring it to be removed, and when it is of the nature of the one here complained of?