The principal of these guaranties are: 1, the _right of suffrage_, which insures to every one his share of sovereignty; 2, the _separation of powers_, which puts into different hands the _executive_, _legislative_, and _judicial_ powers; 3, the _liberty of the press_, which insures the right of minorities, and allows them to employ argument to change or modify the ideas and opinions of the majority.
=84. The right of punishment.=--The right of punishment in a State is nothing else than the right of restraint, which, as we have already seen, is inherent in the very idea of the State; for the State only exists to insure to each the exercise of his rights, and it can only do so by restraint and the use of force. How far can this right of force go? Can it, for example, go so far as the taking of life even? This is a mooted question between publicists, and upon which we have, moreover, already expressed ourselves (p. 55 _et seq._).
After having in these summary views resolved the principle upon which the State rests,[61] and the essential elements which enter into the idea, we are better prepared to approach what constitutes the object proper of civil morality, namely, the duties of citizens toward the country or the State.
=85. Civil duties.=--These duties are the following: _Obedience to the laws_; _respect of magistrates_; _the ballot_; _military service_; _educational obligations_.
=86. Obedience to the laws.=--The first of the civil duties, is _obedience to the laws_. The reason is evident. The State rests on the law. It is the law which substitutes, for the will of individuals, always more or less carried away by passion or governed by self-interest, a general, impartial, and disinterested rule. The law is the guaranty of all: it opposes itself to force, or rather puts force in the service of justice, instead of making of justice the slave of force. Pascal says: "Not being able to make that which is just, strong, men have wished that what is strong should be just." This is the jest of a misanthrope. Certainly the laws are not always as just as they might be, despite the efforts made to render them so: the reason of it is, the extreme complexity of interests between which it is difficult to find a true balance and just equilibrium; but such as they are, they are infinitely more just than the right of the strongest, which would alone reign if there were no laws.