This suggests the final point of advantage which the Romans had, that of the superior military position. Germany could be attacked from three sides, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Ocean. The Romans could select their own time and place of attack, and support a forward thrust in any direction by a powerful flank movement. Any position the Germans took up might have been turned by forces coming from one side or the other, or, if they held their ground, they would be in imminent danger of being caught and crushed between two armies. The rivers of Germany are numerous, and most of them, three at least in the west, navigable for Roman fleets, which could not merely move considerable armies at slight risk far inland, but also furnish inexhaustible supplies. That the Romans know how to use this superior strategical position is clear from the plan of campaign against Maroboduus, and the numerous occasions when the fleet cooperated with the Rhine armies.
To sum up, the Romans had such overwhelming superiority[52] in total population, size of army, general resources, equipment, tactics, strategy and military location, that any serious and persistent effort at conquest could not conceivably have failed. If the Romans, therefore, did not complete a conquest it was unquestionably because they did not desire to do so, not because they could not. As we shall see later on, the course of their operations nowhere shows a consistent effort at subjugation; the reason they did not incorporate Germany into the empire is simply that they were engaged in doing something quite different. We must not forget that what the Middle Ages could not bring about in the Alps, or the Turks in the Balkans, i. e., the utter pacification of these districts, the Romans accomplished with ease and celerity, while Charlemagne, with forces and opportunities incomparably inferior to those of Rome, achieved the most thorough subjugation of the Germanic tribes. To deny that Rome could have done the same is an utterly untenable position.