[1] A British brigade was sent down to the city in the course of the evening.
[2] A contraction of Throgmorton's Neck. As this was an island at high tide, the Americans quickly barred the passage to the mainland by breaking down the bridge.
[3] On account of the want of wagons this was very slowly done, as the wagons had to be unloaded and sent back for what could not be brought along with the troops.
[4] This rested on Chatterton's Hill, some distance in front of the main line. Not having intrenched, the defenders were overpowered, though not until after making a sharp fight.
[5] An excellent account of the operations at Fort Washington will be found in Graydon's _Memoirs_, p. 197 _et seq._
[6] Lieut. Martin Hunter, of the Fifty-second Foot.
The dilemma now confronting Washington was hydra-headed. Either way it was serious. On one side New England lay open to the enemy, on the other New Jersey. And an advance was also threatened from the North. If he stayed where he was, the enemy would overrun New Jersey at will. Should he move his army into New Jersey, Howe could easily cut off its communications with New England, the chief resource for men and munitions. Of course this was not to be thought of. On the other hand, the conquest of New Jersey, with Philadelphia as the ultimate prize, in all probability would be Howe's next object. At the present moment there was nothing to prevent his marching to Philadelphia, arms at ease. To think of fighting in the open field was sheer folly. And there was not one fortified position between the Hudson and the Delaware where the enemy's triumphal march might be stayed.
Forced by these adverse circumstances to attempt much more than twice his present force would have encouraged the hope of doing successfully, Washington decided that he must place himself between the enemy and Philadelphia, and at the same time hold fast to his communications with New England and the upper Hudson. This could only be done by dividing his greatly weakened forces into two corps, one of which should attempt the difficult task of checking the enemy in the Jerseys, while the other held a strong position on the Hudson, until Howe's purposes should be more fully developed. With Washington it was no longer a choice of evils, but a stern obedience to imperative necessity.