Those writers who have espoused, and those who have impugned, the conclusion that language is the natural fruit of the endowments which have been conferred on our species, have, for the most part, mutually assumed that conclusion to be irreconcilable with the common origin of the different nations and languages of the globe. Each ancient sept, they take for granted, must in that case be inferred to have had a distinct origin, and to have invented a distinct language for itself. But there is no necessary connexion between the premises and the conclusion. All nations may have emanated from one parent sept, and all languages may have sprung from one parent tongue, and yet the parent speech may, notwithstanding, have been the product of Man’s own native energies in the earliest era of his existence! Our species may have been invested with the faculty of constructing a language adequate to meet all its first wants, and yet that faculty may have been exercised only once!
The conclusion adopted above is supported by the dictates of Analogy, as traceable in the instance of provisions made for wants analogous to those which language is calculated to supply. Destined to pass successively through various phases of civilization, and to push his colonies into every clime and country, Man required and has received, both in his physical and mental constitution, powers of adaptation that enable him to conform to those marvellous changes which are incident to his condition as a Progressive Being. His first infantine feelings are expressed by imitations of surrounding objects, and as his higher moral and intellectual faculties are developed, they find utterance in metaphors derived from the organs of sensation. In those advances which he was mysteriously intended to make from age to age, he would have been fettered and not aided by the gift of an immutable language! His wants in this respect have been more wisely provided for by the power which has evidently been conferred upon him of framing in the first instance a language calculated to express his earliest wants as they successively arose, and of subsequently moulding it to suit the emergencies of his condition.
It was the opinion of Adam Smith that the elements of language consist of Nouns or Names of things. From this opinion, M. Du Ponceau dissents. Nor is this conclusion confirmed by an analysis of languages, which serves to show, on the contrary, that these elements or roots partake less of the character of Nouns or Names of Objects than of that of Verbs or terms descriptive of their actions and qualities. This result appears to be a necessary consequence of the imitative origin of language, for it is only their characteristic sounds or other salient qualities that admit of imitation, it is impossible to copy by the voice the objects themselves! The English word Cuc-koo furnishes an excellent example. This word is now used as a Noun or Name. But it is quite manifest that originally it was a mere imitation of the characteristic cry of the bird, in other words it was descriptive of a single quality or action!
