13. As it would not be consistent with the plan of this work to give a detailed account of the influence of the Peloponnesian war upon the political and private character of the Greeks, we must be content to point out the following obvious points of opposition between the contending parties. In the first place, then, _Dorians were opposed to Ionians_; and hence in the well-known oracle it was called the Doric war.(843) The individual exceptions are for the most part merely apparent;(844) also when the Athenians attacked Sicily, all the Doric cities were opposed to them.(845) On the side of Athens were ranged all the Ionians of Europe, of the islands, and of Asia, not indeed voluntarily, but still not altogether against their inclination. _The union of the free Greeks against the evil ambition of one state._ At the beginning of the war the general voice of Greece was in favour of Sparta(846) (which was heard through the Delphian oracle, when it promised that state assistance);(847) nor did she compel any one to join in it. The allies of Athens, having previously been Persian subjects, were accustomed to obey; and on the present occasion forced to submit; the public assembly of Athens was the only free voice in so large a combination. _Land-forces against sea-forces._ According to the speech of Pericles, Peloponnesus was able, in an action with heavy-armed troops, to resist all the rest of Greece together; and Athens avoided coming to this mode of engagement with singular ingenuity. The fleet of the Peloponnesians, on the other hand, was at the beginning of the war very inconsiderable.(848) Hence it was some time before the belligerent parties even so much as encountered one another. The land was the means of communication for one party, the sea for the other: hence the states friendly to Athens were immediately compelled to build _long walls_ for the purpose of connecting the chief city with the sea, and isolating it from the land; as Megara before, and Argos and Patræ during the war.(849) _Large bodies of men practised in war against wealth._ The Peloponnesians carried on the war with natives: whereas Athens manned her fleet—the basis of her power—chiefly with foreign seamen; so that the Corinthians said justly that the power of Athens was rather purchased than native.(850) It was the main principle of Pericles’ policy, and it is also adopted by Thucydides in the famous introduction to his History, that it is not the country and people, but moveable property, (χρήματα, in the proper sense of the word,) which makes states great and powerful. _Slow and deliberate conviction against determined rashness._ This is evident both from the different direction taken by the alliances of the two parties, and from their national character. It was with good reason that the oracle admonished Sparta to carry on the war with decision and firmness; for that state was always cautious of undertaking a war, and ready for peace.(851) _Maintenance of ancient custom as opposed to the desire of novelty._ The former was the chief feature of the Doric, the latter of the Ionic race. The Dorians wished to preserve their ancient dignity and power, as well as their customs and religious feelings: the Ionians were commonly in pursuit of something new, frequently, as in the case of the Sicilian expedition, but obscurely seen and conceived. _Union of nations and races against one arbitrarily formed._ As has been already shown, this difference was the cause of the war; and indeed Athens in the course of it hardly recognised any duty in small states to remain faithful to cities of the same race, and to their mother countries; otherwise, why was Melos so barbarously punished, for remembering rather that it was a colony of Sparta than an island? Thus also in the interior of states the Athenians encouraged political associations or clubs (ἑταιρίαι), while the Spartans trusted to the ties of relationship.(852) _Aristocracy against democracy._(853) This difference was manifested in the first half of the war by Athens changing, while Sparta only restored governments; for in this instance also the power of Sparta was in strictness only employed in upholding ancient establishments, as an aristocracy may indeed be overthrown, but cannot be formed in a moment.