Attorney-at-law von Rohrscheidt Defense Counsel for Rudolf Hess
To the General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, Nurnberg:
_Reference: Rudolf Hess—Session of 30 November 1945._
I. Reply to the request of the Tribunal of 28 November 1945.
I, as Counsel for the Defendant Hess, answer the request of the Tribunal of 28 November 1945 as follows:
1. No formal objection is being raised by Defense against presentation and use of the expert opinions obtained by the Tribunal.
2. The Defense does not think the defendant Hess to be “verhandlungsfaehig” (in a state of health to be tried).
3. Material objections are being raised by the Defense, inasmuch as the expert opinion denies the competence of the defendant as a consequence of a mental disorder.
For the proceedings, I, as Counsel for the Defendant Hess, wish to make the following statement:
_a._ That a decision be made to adjourn the proceedings against the defendant temporarily.
_b._ That in case incapacity to be tried is asserted, proceedings in absentia against the defendant should not be carried on.
_c._ That in case my motion _ad a_ is rejected, a super expert opinion be obtained from additional eminent psychiatrists.
_ad 1-a_: The adjournment of the proceedings is necessary because of the unfitness of the defendant to follow them.
In this respect the (medical) opinions state unanimously upon the questions asked by the Tribunal, that “the ability of the Defendant Hess is impaired to the extent that he cannot defend himself, nor oppose a witness, nor understand the details of evidence.” Even if the amnesia does not keep him from understanding what happens about him or to understand the course of the trial, this amnesia nevertheless has a disturbing effect on his defense.
The impairment of the defendant in his defense, through his amnesia, recognized by all opinions as a mental defect, has to be acknowledged as such, in view of the statements in the opinions of the Soviet, English and American Delegations of 14 November 1945, which designate the mental condition as one of a mixed kind, but more as one of a sort of mental abnormality. This will not make a pertinent defense possible for him (Hess).
In this respect, it does not have to be considered that the defendant is not mentally ill “in the literal meaning of the word” and that he can follow the proceedings. The question whether the defendant is at present incapable, as a result of the diminution of his “mental powers,” to understand all occurrences and to defend himself properly, has nothing to do with his mental derangement when committing the crime.