The great diversity of views cited above shows that as yet no satisfactory conclusion has been reached which will explain Rome’s alleged change of policy toward German territory. As we have seen, many have sought other reasons for this change beside the defeat of Varus, a clear indication that it in itself is insufficient. If one must assume such a series of personal and accidental causes, adding supposed conditions of jealousy, weakness of the empire, inadequate finances, etc., it is evident that the defeat of Varus ceases, even under the most favorable interpretation, to be a great climacteric cause. It was only one of a series of contributing causes, i. e., of relatively small concern, and significant only because of chance association with other reasons. The whole position of the theorists as to Varus’ defeat is full of inconsistencies, assumptions, and inferences, at variance with the evidence, and ending in the admission that after all several other causes were equally operative. With this we may take leave of the traditional view as to the significance of the defeat of Varus, in the conviction that no one has reasonable ground to continue to espouse it, when once a simple and satisfactory solution is offered that not only recognizes but explains all the ascertainable facts. And at this point we may summarize the objections which have been adduced against the belief that Augustus had in mind the conquest of Germany:

(1) Varus was defeated with a small army in a battle which was absolutely no test of the military strength of the two peoples.

The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus — Part 43

(2) The defeat was completely avenged by Tiberius and Germanicus, and Germany was overrun by them only a few years later. Only twice in these campaigns did the Germans venture to meet the invaders in the open field, and each time they were severely defeated.

The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus — Part 43

(3) The Roman power was vastly greater than that of even a united Germany, and could unquestionably have completed a thorough conquest had that been the desire.

The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus — Part 43

(4) It was contrary in the first place to the well-known character of Augustus to attempt this war of conquest, and in the second place, after having begun it, to abandon the undertaking.

(5) It was also contrary to the well-recognized peace policy of Rome at this period.