[p1230] VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge.
This is a timely appeal from the final judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's complaint on defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, Mrs. Meyr, was employed as a teacher by the defendant school district by separate annual contracts for the school years commencing in 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975 under probationary contracts which recited that the contracts shall be continued from year to year until modified or terminated under Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 168.101 et seq. (Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1977) and that they also are subject to the rules, regulations and policies of the Board, receipt of copies of which was acknowledged by the plaintiff.
On April 7, 1976, during the plaintiff's fourth year as a probationary teacher, a notice was personally served upon her which read:
The Affton Board of Education, at its March 30, 1976 meeting, unanimously voted to terminate your employment by not retaining your contract as a probationary teacher in the Affton School District effective the end of this current school year, June 4, 1976.
Plaintiff in Count I of her complaint asserted that her right to due process under the fourteenth amendment was violated. After depositions were taken, Count VI was added by leave of the court asserting that her first amendment right of free speech was violated. Jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 is asserted. Jurisdiction of this court is not contested. Counts II through V alleged claims of violation of Missouri statutes and invoked pendent jurisdiction.
In passing on the summary judgment motions, the court had before it depositions of the defendants, affidavits of the parties, interrogatories and answers thereto, and numerous exhibits.
The court (Judge Regan), for reasons set forth in a memorandum opinion reported at 435 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D. Mo. 1977), found plaintiff was not a tenured teacher, that she had no property rights, that her liberty rights were not violated, and that violation of her free speech rights was not established.
For a reversal the plaintiff urges that the trial court erred in the following respects:
I. Holding plaintiff had no property interest in continued employment.
II. Holding that plaintiff's liberty interests had not been infringed by the defendants.
III. Holding that termination was not based, even partially, upon plaintiff's exercise of her first amendment free speech rights.
We affirm for the reasons hereinafter set out.
The facts are fairly set out in the trial court's opinion and additional facts to the extent necessary will be set out in the course of this opinion.
I.
The court committed no error in determining plaintiff had no property right in [p1231] continued employment. The plaintiff in effect concedes that she had not obtained tenure under Mo. Ann. Stat. § 168.104(5) (Vernon Supp. 1977), which reads:
(5) "Probationary teacher", any teacher as herein defined who has been employed full time in the same school for five successive years or less. A teacher recognized as a full-time teacher by a public school retirement system shall be recognized as a full-time teacher under sections 168.102 to 168.130. In the case of any probationary teacher who has been employed in any other school system as a full-time teacher for two or more years, the board of education shall waive one year of his probationary period.
It is conceded that plaintiff had many years of prior teaching experience and that she would acquire tenure after completing four years of service unless appropriate notice of non-renewal was served upon her as provided by Missouri law.
Plaintiff states:
However, the Court wrongly suggests that plaintiff urged the Court to rule that she had obtained tenure pursuant to state statute. . . . This is not her position. Joyce Meyr alleged in her Complaint and in her Motion for Summary Judgment that she was entitled to certain due process protections because of the notice requirements of the Rules and Regulations of the school board, and that these notice requirements were not met.
In any event, the record reflects that the plaintiff had not acquired tenure at the time notice of non-renewal was served.
Plaintiff urges that the Board is required to provide the benefits conferred by Board Policy No. 4118 III D, which reads:
If the Board determines that a teacher is not doing satisfactory work, the Board through its administrative representative shall give the teacher a written statement definitely setting forth his alleged incompetency and specifying the nature thereof. . . .