To apportion to single columns or Divisions for particular circumstances an increased force of Cavalry, to be taken from the available mass of independent Cavalry Divisions, ought not in general to occasion unusual friction; but it is most difficult and troublesome to take away from the Infantry the squadrons definitely assigned to it by peace-time organization, and unite these in independent Cavalry Commands.
We must not allow ourselves to be misled in this matter by the practice followed in peace manoeuvres. Even the largest concentration of troops for these purposes is, in proportion to the masses to be employed in our future War, on a most limited scale.
Our smaller Brigade and Divisional manoeuvres are restricted within limits which can only be considered nowadays as exceptional. They are only too well adapted to give rise to entirely false conceptions as to the true character of the Cavalry service in these great struggles for national survival, unless we keep steadily in mind that they apply only to exceptional circumstances.
We must, therefore, lay down as a principle that as much Cavalry as possible is to be organized for strategical independence, and as little as is expedient retained for the Infantry Divisions.
My opinion is that, if we make fullest use of the bicycle, and, with this object in view, reorganize our system of conveying orders and intelligence, then two well-trained and effective squadrons should amply suffice for the ordinary duties with an Infantry Division.
As to the allotment of the independent Cavalry Divisions, it follows from all that has been said above, that to divide them in equal proportions among the several Armies, according to their numerical strength, can only be considered as an obstacle to the full utilization of their potential fighting capacity. It would be better to arrange this distribution at the beginning of each War, in accordance with the conditions which the situation imposes. Where it appears expedient, we should not hesitate to form Divisions of different strength, and to group several of these to constitute Cavalry Corps, even to unite several of such Corps for employment in a particular strategical direction--_i.e._, in a particular portion of the theatre of operation--whilst leaving only individual brigades, or even regiments, to those fractions of the Army which for the moment can best dispense with Cavalry support.